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Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy.

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Washington Times

July 19, 2004

Pg. 16

Coming Attack Divinations

By Daniel J. Gallington

Do we have enough people thinking like terrorists? Sure, we have groups that do this, but it's not the kind of job career government people like, and so while these groups are generally formed in reaction to criticism for not having them, they are also generally not taken seriously enough, at least after the initial fanfare in setting them up.

The Defense Department is pretty good at it, however, and they call it "Predictive Analysis." At Defense, it's something that must be done to help plan for an extremely dynamic situation, such as on the battlefield.

From the terrorist's standpoint, however, the battlefields are here, so we need to do much more predictive analysis at home unless we assume some miracle piece of high-tech intelligence, or some wonderfully reliable human source, will tell us where when and how to expect the next attack.

We shouldn't bet on it. Our high-tech sensors aren't much good against this illusive enemy and we have not penetrated terrorist cells as we must to get reliable inside information — in fact, we are probably years away from such a capability.

So, what are the likely scenarios for the next attack?

To begin this kind of analysis — and, thinking like a terrorist — we need to establish the planning factors and assumptions for the attack. Here are some:

- (1) It must be both massive and symbolic, at least the size and significance of the September 11, 2001, attacks.
- (2) It must be able to inflict large numbers of casualties, at least in the thousands.
- (3) It must cause tremendous expense, both to recover from it and from its secondary economic effects.

- (4) It must be against a relatively "soft" target, presenting no real obstacle to attack.
 - (5) It must be an attack that can be executed against multiple targets simultaneously.
 - (6) It must be executed in population centers, to achieve the maximum political and psychological effects.
 - (7) It must be executed using relatively "low tech" means, for example, high explosives, or more easily available poisons, biological or lower grade nuclear-based weapons.
 - (8) The persons executing the attack will be happy — if not eager — to die in the attack.
 - (9) The attacks will share similarity in target and the means used to attack. This simplifies planning.
 - (10) There will be relatively no way to defend against the attacks, even if they are anticipated in time and place.
- There no doubt are other factors and assumptions in the terrorist planners' heads, but this list includes those we have seen time after time in terrorist attacks against us and others around the world. The next one will probably be no different.

So, how is the attack likely to happen?

High on the terrorist planners' list would be an attack against subways in major East Coast cities. It would not be hard to plan or execute this kind of attack, expecting several thousand casualties. Such an attack could be initiated underground, with human-carried high explosives, perhaps followed with a biological or chemical weapon application of some kind.

Another attack scenario would be shoulder-fired, air-to-air missiles, aimed at airliners, around major airports, as the planes were in low final approach or just lifting off. Again, these would be relatively easy to plan and carry out simultaneously.

Targeting "inbound" international airliners as targets or using them as suicide strike vehicles remains very tempting for terrorist groups. And there are several scenarios that reduce our ability to prevent or inhibit such an attack. While we must do our best to anticipate how the next attack might come, we will forever be vulnerable to most of them unless we develop good human intelligence sources within the terror cells themselves. This requires a very long-term funding commitment from Congress, and, above all, new and dynamic intelligence leadership. In the meantime, we need a whole new emphasis on "predictive analysis" here at home.

We must act quickly — because we can be assured the attacks described above are in some stage of advanced planning — and perhaps all three of them.

Daniel J. Gallington is a senior research fellow at the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies in Arlington, Va. He last served in government as deputy assistant defense secretary for territorial security. Earlier, he was general counsel for the Senate Select Intelligence Committee and Justice Department deputy counsel for intelligence policy.

<http://www.washtimes.com/commentary/20040718-091122-1628r.htm>

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Time

July 26, 2004

Notebook

The Smallpox Scare

Was the germ-warfare risk overblown?

By Massimo Calabresi and Melissa August

Did faulty intelligence lead to an overblown scare over smallpox? The Administration said the possibility of a smallpox attack by Iraq strengthened its case for war — and necessitated a major inoculation campaign. By mid-June, some 627,000 military employees and nearly 40,000 civilian first responders and health-care workers had been vaccinated. But this month's Senate report on prewar intelligence has concluded that the CIA's 2002 estimate that there was "an even chance" Saddam had weaponized smallpox was "not supported" by the evidence and says the agency now admits it has "no evidence that Iraq ever weaponized smallpox." David Kay, who ran the postwar hunt for Iraq's illegal weapons, says, "We spent a lot of effort on the smallpox threat, but by December [2003] we had come to the conclusion that there was just a dead end there."

That news comes too late for some. The civilian program has reported close to 900 "adverse events" occurring within days of inoculation, including one confirmed death from the vaccine. The military has reported one death and 75 cases of heart inflammation caused by the vaccine. The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) last December launched a \$42 million compensation program for those hurt by the vaccine; 54 requests for compensation have so far been filed with HHS, and one \$262,000 payment for death has been made.

Supporters of the inoculation program say the danger of a smallpox attack is still real. The CIA stands by its 2002 assertion that North Korea may have the smallpox pathogen — though U.S. officials tell TIME that intelligence is even less reliable than what the CIA had on Iraq's smallpox program. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz last month ordered an expansion of the Pentagon's smallpox-inoculation program. And HHS Secretary Tommy

Thompson vowed as recently as January to continue pushing civilian smallpox vaccinations. But that may not last. A senior Thompson adviser, Donald Henderson — who ran the World Health Organization program that eradicated smallpox worldwide in the 1970s — told TIME last week that civilian inoculations are no longer necessary. "We don't need to vaccinate the first responders," he said. Top-level dissent could be the beginning of the end for the controversial program.

<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040726-665072,00.html>

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Washington Post

July 18, 2004

Pg. C1

Anthrax Probers Still Seek Md. Leads

Frederick Remains A Focus of Attention

By Allan Lengel, Washington Post Staff Writer

The chatter at the Frederick Stamp Club rarely goes beyond talk about coveted and hard-to-find stamps. But a few months ago, two postal investigators joined the group's meeting to discuss a more pressing, deadly matter: anthrax. The agents sat at a conference table in a Frederick County church and began to quiz club members, a mix of elementary school students and adults. They politely asked whether anyone had purchased a pre-stamped 34-cent envelope at a postal facility in the Frederick area, the type used in the series of mailings that delivered the lethal 2001 anthrax attacks.

"Unfortunately, none of us had purchased any envelopes in Frederick," said club member Jackson Cope, explaining that the agents wanted to know whether a certain blue-gray shaded envelope had been sold in the area.

It was an interesting night for the stamp club, but another in a long series of dead ends for law enforcement authorities. From stamp clubs to biowarfare research laboratories, the FBI and other agencies are continuing to seek the clues that will unlock the mystery surrounding the attacks that killed five people and sickened 17 others.

The spore-laden letters were mailed in pre-stamped envelopes to the offices of Sens. Thomas A. Daschle (D-S.D.) and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) and media outlets in Florida and New York. The people who died were two workers at the Brentwood Road postal facility in Northeast Washington, a Florida photojournalist, a New York hospital worker and an elderly Connecticut woman.

"We are going through and doing what we have to do to bring it to a resolution," said Michael A. Mason, head of the FBI's Washington field office. "We are working on this as actively as we did Day One."

About 30 FBI agents and 13 postal investigators are actively pursuing the case, dubbed "Amerithrax." In the past 33 months, agents have traveled to three continents and, according to the FBI, conducted more than 5,280 interviews, issued more than 4,480 grand jury subpoenas and contracted out thousands of hours of lab work, narrowing down the type of anthrax to a strain called Ames.

Yet the investigation keeps returning to the Frederick area, home to the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases at Fort Detrick. The lab, a possible source of the anthrax bacteria, once employed scientist Steven J. Hatfill, whose apartment in Frederick was searched twice by federal agents in the summer of 2002. Described in August 2002 by Attorney General John D. Ashcroft as a "person of interest" in the probe, Hatfill is still viewed that way, according to law enforcement sources. They said they also have interest in a small group of other scientists, some of whom have no ties to Fort Detrick. The sources spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing the sensitive nature of the probe.

Hatfill, a medical doctor and bioterrorism expert, has not been charged with any wrongdoing. He has denied involvement in the attacks and has filed lawsuits against the Justice Department and the New York Times, alleging defamation.

The efforts in the Frederick area are being made as authorities try to finalize complex lab tests in hopes of tracing the anthrax to its point of origin. Scientists are hoping to match the gene sequence of the mailed anthrax or a contaminant found inside it to samples collected across the country and overseas, according to law enforcement authorities and other sources.

Scientists are continuing to refine the tests, which could take several months, law enforcement sources said. But the sources and scientists have cautioned that there are no guarantees that the tests will be of great benefit, because the nation's labs used to keep poor records of the whereabouts of anthrax stocks and who came and went at the facilities. Fort Detrick, the largest employer in the city of Frederick, is one of several labs in the United States that have remained a focus of investigators. Early in the probe, investigators interviewed Fort Detrick's scientists; some were given polygraph examinations.

Last summer, the FBI spent about \$250,000 and three weeks draining a pond in Frederick, acting on a theory that someone might have discarded contaminated materials there.

Although the pond yielded nothing that would aid the investigation, authorities have continued to look to Fort Detrick for leads.

Earlier this year, postal investigators interviewed employees at the Fort Detrick lab, according to their attorney, Rosemary McDermott. She said the questions included queries about access to "hot suites," areas at the facility where work is done on anthrax and other dangerous biological agents.

The investigators also wanted to know whether the employees ever saw anyone doing unauthorized research on anthrax, she said.

McDermott said the employees told investigators that they did not have access to the "hot suites" and that they never saw unauthorized research on biological agents.

In May, investigators re-interviewed another of McDermott's clients, Ayaad Assaad, a former Fort Detrick scientist. Assaad, an Egyptian American, was laid off in 1997 as part of a staff reduction and is suing the Army for age and racial discrimination.

Assaad, currently an acting team leader and toxicologist at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, was first interviewed in October 2001 after authorities received an anonymous letter identifying him as a "potential bioterrorist."

The letter, postmarked in late September 2001, was mailed after the first batch of anthrax letters was sent but before it became public that anyone had gotten sick. Assaad suggested in 2001 that someone responsible for the anthrax killings mailed the anonymous letter about him to divert attention.

Authorities have said they have no evidence suggesting Assaad was involved in the attacks.

Assaad and his attorney said they most recently met with agents at McDermott's office in Thurmont.

McDermott said the agents again asked questions about the anonymous letter and implied that it might be linked to the anthrax attacks. Agents also asked Assaad whether pre-stamped letters were available at Fort Detrick;

McDermott said they were not.

In recent telephone interviews, Assaad recalled that agents asked him in May about the process of refining anthrax. He said he told the agents that it was not necessary to know that process, because the anthrax in labs was already in that form, and that there was a "long history" at Fort Detrick of people pilfering "anthrax and everything."

He said he then told agents that he suspected that current or former Fort Detrick employees were involved in the anthrax attacks and tried to make him a "scapegoat."

Assaad said he provided the agents with records from a conference in Crystal City that showed he was there when the first batch of anthrax letters was sent from New Jersey.

At one point, Assaad said, his attorney asked agents whether he was a suspect. "They said, 'Absolutely not.' They repeated that twice," he said.

Frederick Mayor Jennifer P. Dougherty said she expects that the FBI will remain a presence in her community in the months ahead, adding that the FBI "made it clear from the start that agents would be back regularly until the investigation is completed."

"I hope there is a resolution, but I hope the person comes from Poughkeepsie, not Fort Detrick," she added. "We hope it's not someone who's a neighbor, either past or current. You don't want to be the one on the evening news saying, 'He seemed like such a nice guy.'"

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58250-2004Jul17.html>

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Moscow Times

July 19, 2004

Pg. 4

Chemical Weapons

MOSCOW (AP) -- Russia will not meet a 2007 deadline to destroy some 8,000 tons of chemical weapons due to a lack of funds, said Viktor Ozerov, the chairman of the Federation Council's Defense and Security Committee, on Friday.

The Interfax-Military News Agency quoted Ozerov as saying the lack of federal funds would prevent new facilities for destroying weapons from being built and could result in dangerous chemicals leaking into the environment.

The delay in funding, he said, "will not allow the country to destroy more than 8,000 tons of poisonous substances, a mere 20 percent of the stockpile, before 2007, as declared."

Ozerov said that nearly 33,000 damaged chemical weapons needed to be destroyed "urgently," and added that only one facility for destroying chemical weapons has started operations, near Saratov.

<http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2004/07/19/031.html>

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Los Angeles Times

10:56 AM PDT, July 20, 2004

U.N. Weapons Inspectors Bound for Iraq

CAIRO, Egypt — Iraq's new government has asked U.N. inspectors to return to the country, the head of the U.N. nuclear watchdog said Tuesday.

"The return of U.N. inspectors to Iraq is an urgent necessity; not to search for weapons of mass destruction but to write the final report about the nonexistence of (such) weapons ... in Iraq, which will enable the lifting of sanctions," Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told reporters in Cairo.

He said the invitation was issued by Iraqi Foreign Minister Hoshiyar Zebari.

The inspectors will be sent in the next few days, ElBaradei said.

The inspectors, who will continue their work to ensure that Iraq adheres with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, will return as soon as safety arrangements have been made, agency spokeswoman Melissa Fleming said from the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, Austria.

The inspectors would go to Tuwaitha nuclear complex, 12 miles south of Baghdad, U.N. officials said Wednesday. The will conduct "an inventory verification on the nuclear material remaining in Iraq," Fleming added.

Besides safeguards inspectors, the agency also had weapons inspectors in Iraq who searched for nuclear weapons under a mandate from the U.N. Security Council. Those inspectors left just before the beginning of the U.S.-led invasion in March 2003.

The U.N. Security Council is to decide when the weapons inspectors can return. The agency repeatedly has said it wants to send them back to finish their job.

In Washington, State Department spokesman said the inspection in Iraq is unrelated to the one which occurred during the months preceding the Iraq war.

He said the new inspection is part of a regular IAEA program that involves all countries which have had safeguard agreements with the agency.

"One shouldn't confuse these inspections with the UNMOVIC, the prewar special regime that applied to Iraq," Boucher said.

He added that there has been some media misinterpretation of ElBaradei's announcement.

http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/wire/ats-ap_top12jul20.1.395874.story

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Korea Times

July 20, 2004

Bolton Renews Call for Libyan Model for NK Nuke Resolution

By Ryu Jin

Staff Reporter

A top U.S. disarmament envoy met South Korea's top diplomats on Tuesday to discuss Washington's efforts to block the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the North Korean nuclear issue, according to officials.

John Bolton, under secretary of state for arms control and international security who came to Seoul Monday for a four-day visit, had separate meetings with South Korea's Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon and his deputy, Lee Soo-hyuck.

"I know both President Roh Moo-hyun and President George W. Bush are very eager to have a peaceful, diplomatic solution to the North Korean nuclear problem," Bolton told Minister Ban during their 30-minute talk.

One of the Bush administration's harshest critics of North Korea, Bolton's trip to Seoul and Tokyo has prompted speculation as it comes at a time when the multilateral efforts to solve the North's nuclear standoff were gaining momentum.

"I think your visit this time is very timely," Ban said, citing frequent exchanges of senior level officials between involved nations in recent weeks, including the summit meeting Wednesday between South Korea and Japan.

The U.S. envoy reminded South Korean officials of the "Libya model" which the U.S. sees as a desirable solution to the North Korean standoff. "We've had some successes in that area in the case of Libya renouncing the pursuit of WMD, a very significant move forward. I think as we prepare for the next round of six-party talks, it is important to keep all those lessons in mind," he said.

The U.S. State Department said Bolton's unusually long trip to Seoul was aimed at discussing the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or the ``PSI" concept.

``PSI, Proliferation Security Initiative, is always one of the main focuses of his travel," State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said during a press briefing in Washington.

While talking with Ban, Bolton thanked South Korea for its effort for nonproliferation of the WMD, including its recent participation in the Global Partnership.

But a South Korean official who attended the meeting said the U.S. official didn't make further remarks related to the PSI.

Under the initiative, launched in 2002, the Bush administration has been seeking international support for seizing suspected arms shipments from what it classifies ``rogue states," such as North Korea, before they reach their destinations.

Seoul, though sympathizing with the U.S.' goals, seems reluctant to openly participate in the initiative for fear of upsetting Pyongyang and undermining inter-Korean reconciliation.

Some experts believed his visit is aimed at delivering the U.S. hawks' hard-line stance toward Pyongyang, while others said it could be interpreted as a sign that Washington is moving closer to the stances of its two Asian allies in resolving the longstanding impasse with the Stalinist North.

After the last round of six-party nuclear talks made some meaningful progress late last month, U.S. chief negotiator James Kelly recently described to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee a U.S. proposal that would extend energy aid as part of a solution to the nuclear crisis.

Under the U.S. proposal, Kelly said the North must first commit to the dismantling of its nuclear programs, including the highly enriched uranium program that Pyongyang denies having.

Many analysts are upbeat about the prospects for further progress, saying the plan is a departure from President George W. Bush's staunch refusal to hold direct talks or to offer incentives to induce the North to halt its nuclear programs.

The crisis over North Korea's nuclear ambitions erupted in October 2002 when U.S. officials claimed that Pyongyang had admitted that it had a secret program to enrich uranium for use in weapons. This was in addition to a separate program for producing plutonium, another type of nuclear fuel, that was frozen under a 1994 U.S.-North Korea accord but has since been resumed.

Most U.S. officials generally believe that Pyongyang may currently have at least two and perhaps as many as eight nuclear weapons.

<http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200407/kt2004072017303711960.htm>

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